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Introduction
On January 11, 2007 , and after 12 years of accession process, Vietnam became the 150th member of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Becoming a member of the WTO ultimately implies a binding tariff schedule. The Vietnamese accession process will be formally completed when a gradual reduction of the existing tariff rates reach the pre-determined final rates. This will be the case in 2014.
The present paper evaluates this accession-led trade liberalization using a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model calibrated to the Vietnamese economy. In doing that, special attention is paid to the existence of state-owned enterprises and how they affect the economy by large.
Moreover, we pay attention to income distribution issues among heterogeneous households and we investigate how different trade liberalization schemes affect this distribution. While linking trade liberalization to income distribution is not by itself novel, doing that in the presence of state-owned enterprises and for a calibrated model of the Vietnamese WTO accession is, to the best of our knowledge, novel to the literature. 1 In modelling state-owned enterprises we follow the approach adopted in several writings about state-owned enterprises in general, viz. that they do not maximize profits (see Schmitz We will show that if the state-owned enterprises behaved as profit maximizers, the WTO accession tariff reforms would both increase aggregate real income and reduce income inequality -clearly, a win-win situation. However, with state-owned enterprises maximizing revenues, the WTO accession tariff reforms will end up doing exactly the opposite, viz. reduce aggregate income and increase income inequality. The same will be true for other well-known reform rules -the concertina rule (where the highest tariff is reduced to the second highest level) and the 1 See Abbott et al. (2009) for a survey of this literature using Vietnam as the case of study. Similar to our paper, Ghosh and Whalley (2008) focus on Vietnam and trade liberalization under state-owned enterprices. However, both the model and the experiments they consider are quite different from ours (they apply a shirking model of state-owned enterprises that they use to analyze the case of zero tariffs, and thus not a move from one tariff-ridden equilibrium to another).
proportional rule (where all tariff rates are reduced by the same proportion). In other words, all the well-known tariff reduction rules bound to fail when state-owned enterprises distort the market economy.
Given this distorting behavior of state-owned enterprises, one may want to know what kind of tariff reform would achieve the goals of higher real income and lower income inequality. We show that the main characteristic of this reform has to be a large and disproportionate reduction of the protection of the state-owned sector -in fact, we will show that if the imports of the goods produced by the state-owned enterprises are subsidized, both welfare and income distribution will improve. We will provide intuition for this and all other results after we explain what stateowned enterprises imply to the market equilibrium. Firstly, however, and in order to set the background for our model choices, we provide a brief description of the Vietnamese economy and the significance of the state-owned enterprises in that economy.
Vietnam.
Vietnam is a country in change. It is turning global in many aspectsculturally, socially, and economically. Table 1 However, while industrialization has made manufacturing and services the predominant providers of value added, the income source of the majority of the Vietnamese population is still the primary sector. As of 2006, more than 58 % of the population were employed within these industries (see table 2 ).
Since the majority of the population, and especially of the lower-income households, is employed in the labour-intensive primary sector, this sector is of special consideration. That the poor people work in the rural areas is supported by looking at the urban-rural 0.37 Gini coef- Focusing on the importance of state-owned enterprises it should be mentioned that from 1995 to 2006, state ownership of production facilities has decreased from 50% to 38%, household ownership of production facilities has decreased from 36% to 30%, while foreign investment ownership of production has increased from 6% to 17%. Moreover, this state production is very much focused in the industrial sector; in 2006, 75% of the state output was industrial output. The production functions applied in the model are Cobb-Douglas:
where   is the specific factor of the respective sectors, and thus
is just a scalar.
Three of the sectors have identical structures but different inputs to production. In the primary sector,   , the single immobile factor is land, while in the two other competitive sectors the immobile factor is sector-specific capital. Profit maximization under perfect competition yields the traditional result that labour is paid its marginal product value. Moreover, zero profits are achieved. The immobile factor is paid a residual rent. That is,
The fourth sector, the state-owned enterprises, behaves differently. By assuming that the management of the state-owned firms seeks to maximize the size of the enterprise and not its profits, it hires as many workers as possible. Hence, state capital is considered allocated free of cost from the perspective of the state-owned firm. The problem of the firm simply is to maximize revenues subject to the wage bill, which implies hiring labour at a nominal wage rate equal to the value average product of labour,  =   ·    , instead of the value marginal product of labour,   ·    , as is the case in the rest of the economy. Since    0,      for any   0 As is the case in the competitive part of the economy, the residual rents of the SOE go to the immobile factor: state allocated capital. However, since capital is allocated free of cost, the rents accrued by the government are effectively zero. 3 2.2. Households. The model considers three households. Two lower-income households in rural and urban areas,  1 and  2 respectively, and a higher-income household,  3 , found both in the rural and urban areas. Household preferences for the goods consumed are represented by CES utility functions
where  is the elasticity of substitution, 4 and  denotes the share parameter that determines demand patterns of the households.
The income of each of the households is given by
where   are household shares of labour income (with P  P    = 1), and   are the residual rents from immobile factors (with P  P 6 =   = 1). Using  and , the modeler assigns property rights of the total economy factor endowments to the households.  denotes total transfers to/from the government. These are described in detail when introducing the government below.
  denotes household share of  where P    = 1. Welfare maximization subject to the income equal expenditure constraint leads to the following demand functions
where
1−  is the subjective CES price index.
Government.
Given our small open economy assumption, world prices are kept fixed.
By setting tariffs at an arbitrary level the government has full control over the domestic prices.
Assuming ad valorem tariff rates, the domestic prices () are given by world prices (  ) times the mark-up (1 + ), where  is the percentage tax rate on imports, i.e.
The government solely focuses on managing a balanced budget. Hence, it is simply repre-9 sented by a budget constraint
where  is government expenditure,  is revenues from trade taxes and rents accrued from state-owned enterprise capital (which, as discussed above, is zero if SOE maximize revenues), and   being imports defined as excess demand (
The actions available to balance the budget are simple lump-sum taxes, i.e. either collecting a lump sum tax from the households in case of a budget deficit, or distributing a lump sum tax to the consumers in case of a budget surplus.
Finally, full employment and balanced trade conditions are imposed to clear the labour and goods markets, respectively.
Before moving to the calibration of the model using data from Vietnam, we should emphasize the importance of having state-owned enterprises (SOE) in the model. We showed that under the assumption that SOEs maximize revenues, a SOE will hire labour at a wage equal to the value of the average product instead of the value of the marginal product of labour. The SOE will thus demand more labour than is economically efficient. This higher demand will drive up the (nominal) wage and lower the potential output of the rest of the economy. In this situation, a tariff on SOE produced goods will aggravate the distortion SOEs create, as it will even further move recourses towards the state-owned sector. Reducing tariffs is naturally a correct response to this. However, as the theory of the second-best tells us, not any tariff reduction will work.
That is exactly the purpose of building an applied general equilibrium and calibrating to the Vietnamese data. The primary production sector,   , includes the activities agriculture, forestry and fishing 326% of non-primary production value added. These are split on the two private sectors,   and   , since the assumption of un-priced capital in state-owned enterprises implies that labour value added makes up a 100% of total factor value added going into SOE production,   .
Recall that the value of   is a product of  Moving into the demand side of the economy, we need to match the Vietnamese reality described in the introductory section and thus consider three heterogenous households: the lower income rural population,  1 , the lower income urban population,  2 , and the higher income population,  3 , found in urban as well as rural Vietnam.
The key to distribute factor income among the three households stems from Nielsen's (2002) social accountancy matrix (SAM) found most suitable for the purpose of this analysis. From this SAM, a small sub-matrix is extracted and simplified.
The point of departure for creating the postulated income distribution is an assignment of rights of access to the factor endowments. As mentioned previously, income inequality in
Vietnam is no higher than in a typical European economy. In general, inequality is low but there is an above average inequality between rural and urban Vietnam and within urban Vietnam, while in the rural areas the average Vietnamese citizen tends to be poorer and facing almost no inequality. This view has spurred an assignment of rights of access to income accrued from unskilled, medium skilled, and skilled types of labour used in Nielsen (2002) , and from land and capital. In doing that, we note that while general education in Vietnam is not high compared to developed economies, the majority of the population has a standard elementary school education and literacy levels are above 90% for both genders (UNESCO). This has led to the assumption that the lower income households receive income both from paid unskilled jobs and from (medium skill) self-employment. The lower income rural household receives 15% of land rents whereas the majority of land rents are received by the higher income household. The result of this procedure is presented in row one (benchmark) and row two (final accession rates) of table 7 -the rest of the rows present other tariff reform scenarios examined in this paper and which are explained in detail below.
3.1. The analyzed scenarios. As mentioned above, the benchmark scenario replicates the tariff structure of the Vietnamese economy at the point of entry at the WTO, i.e. in 2007. In that benchmark case, the model in section 2 is used, where state-owned enterprises maximize revenues. Scenarios I-IV in table 7 are all using the same model but with different tariff rates.
Scenario I is applying the WTO accession-led tariff cuts that Vietnam has committed to implement by 2014. As we see, the most notable relative drop is within the light manufacturing sector (a 39% reduction), followed by the SOE sector (19% reduction) and the primary and ROE sector (185% reductions). In terms of absolute tariff reductions, the primary and the light Table 7 : Tariff rates applied in the scenarios, per cent manufacturing sector face a 52 percent points cuts, while the SOE face a 37 percent points cut and the ROE only a 25 percent point cut. Thus, the WTO accession-led tariff cuts reduce both the mean and the variance of the existent tariff structure. As we know from recent results in the theory of tariff reforms, such reductions are likely to be welfare enhancing in standard general equilibrium trade models (see Anderson and Neary, 2007) .
Scenarios II and III focus on other tariff reforms that, in conventional settings, should yield welfare improvements. In scenario II we introduce a concertina cut, where the highest tariff falls to the second highest tariff level, while scenario III introduces a 20% proportional tariff cut to all tariff rates. From theory we know that such reductions will also increase welfare, if goods are substitutes for each other and normality in consumption is assured (see Hatta, 1977 ) -both assumptions that hold in our setting.
Scenario IV reduces the tariff on the SOE produced good leaving the other tariff rates unaltered. In this sense, it is also a univariate reform like the concertina reform, but while the concertina reform reduces the highest tariff (assuming that this was the highest distortion), here we reduce the tariff of the sector that distorts mostly the economy (both due to protection and due to the assumed revenue maximizing behavior). Thus, in essence, the present scenario is really what a concertina reform should do in our model, i.e. reduce only the highest distortion. In order to illustrate the potential gains of such a reform, we calculate the optimal tariff reduction.
By using iteration techniques, the rate that maximizes the welfare gain from such a univariate reform turns out to be a 32% import subsidy. we may get from external (tariff) reforms when internal (SOE) reforms are already in place. 9 4. Results from different counterfactuals Table 8 below presents the main results from the different scenarios. 10 We focus on production efficiency, real income and consumption, real factor rewards, and consumers' welfare change.
Scenarios I -IV: tariff reforms under a distorted SOE sector. The assessment of economy-wide efficiency shows that the implementation of the final WTO tariffs (scenario I)
is not overall beneficiary to Vietnam, nor is it beneficiary for the income inequality that exists in the country. In fact, the lower income rural population will face a money metric welfare loss of 12% of their income, while the richer households will gain by 05%. The reason for this may be assessed both from the supply side and the demand side of the economy.
On the supply side, the change in the tariff scheme is relatively soft on SOE production, implying that the sector stays relatively protected and still demands an excessive amount of labour. According to our calculations (see table A7 in the appendix for detailed sector results) the SOE production consumes 414% -up from 412% in the benchmark scenario -of the effective labour supply. The labour demand effects in the rest of the sectors skew the relative labour demand toward private and government services and other activities (  ) at the expense of the primary sector (  ) and the privately manufactured goods sector (  ).
Since the primary sector production is more sensitive to changes in the size of the labour supply, production drops significantly (see table A4 ). With consumer demand for primary goods 9 Before we proceed to the descrption of the results, it is important to note that in comparing the different scenarios we use different reform sizes. While the concertina brings the highest tariff down to the second highest tariff level, the proportional reform cuts all tariffs linearly by 20%, and the WTO accession reform cuts tariffs nonlinearly by an average of 26 3% In scenario IV, we find the optimal size of the SOE tariff in terms of maximizing welfare gains. Thus, all our scenarios choose different sizes of tariff reductions; a property that in many ways is not ideal if we wanted to compare the welfare effects, e.g. which reform gives the highest welfare increase. A better approach would be to set all scenarios at an equal footing (e.g. by requiring that they deliver the same revenues, or by requiring that they are of the same size) and then see which one performs best (see Raimondos-Møller and Woodland, 2011). Here we stick to the conventional approach of pre-defining different reform sizes and examining only the sign of the effects (and not the size of the effects). 10 More detailed tables are presented in appendix 2.
hardly affected, the production fall will reduce the exports of the primary sector (see table A5 ).
Reduction of exports will reduce the overall Vietnamese purchasing power, per se, and thus the real consumption overall falls. When the lower income rural population suffers the most, it is due to its high dependency on the primary sector. The fall in the effective labour supply in the primary sector and the fall in rents to the immobile factor jointly produce the largest relative decline in real income among the three income groups. It suffers a 12% real income loss while the overall loss for the whole population is only 01%. As we discussed previously, the WTO accession-led reform reduces both the simple mean and variance of the benchmark tariff structure. Even if these are desirable properties of a tariff reform, we do not know with certainty whether this particular reform was put wrongly together. 11 Other, more standard, reform rules should be examined. Within the theory of piecemeal reforms, two rules are standard; the concertina rule and the proportional rule. Both rules are known to provide welfare gains under very general assumptions. However, with a state-owned sector distorting resource allocation, such welfare improvements may not arise.
As seen in column II, table 8, performing a concertina cut will worsen welfare in our model.
The reason is simply the following: lowering the highest tariff (primary products) implies increasing relative protection for the SOE producers. Thus, instead of reducing the biggest distortion in the economy, this reform will increase it. This will happen at the expense of especially the primary sector and thus the labour employed in that sector, which to a large extent is the lowerincome rural population. While the welfare of the urban population will rise, this rise is not enough to neutralize the loss of the rural households.
A proportional cut (column III, table 8) will again not generate gains since lowering all tariffs rates proportionally will bring the primary good tariff level closer to the SOE tariff level.
Thus the SOE sector is again, as in scenarios I and II, protected at the expense of especially the primary sector. Still, and compared to a concertina cut, the SOE sector's protection is relatively reduced. In our simulation example, not significant changes will occur in aggregate real income, production efficiency, and in general aggregate welfare. However, income inequality will definitely increase with the lower income households loosing out again.
Both these two scenarios underline the consequences of underestimating the presence of a special SOE behavior and thus falsely suggesting concertina or proportional cuts in the search for welfare gains.
In scenario IV we return to the univariate type of reforms where only one tariff is reduced.
However, now we choose a different tariff than the highest one. Let us explain. When tariffs are the only distortions in a model, reducing the highest tariff is usually equivalent to reducing the biggest distortion. However, when other distortions are in place, the highest tariff may not be equivalent with the biggest distortion. In the present model the sector that distorts mostly the efficient allocation of resources is the sector with state-owned enterprises. Even if that sector does not face the highest tariff protection, it is that sector's tariff that should be reduced. Leaving thus all the other tariffs unaltered, scenario IV allows the tariff of the SOE sector to fall. 12 
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The next question then is how much to reduce that tariff. 13 In what follows we use iteration techniques and perform a numerical search for the locally optimal SOE tariff, i.e. a SOE tariff that maximizes the aggregate welfare gain given that the other tariffs do not change. As can be read from table 7, this optimal tariff turns out to be negative, i.e. an import subsidy, and equal to 32% By subsidizing the imports of the goods produced by the state-owned enterprises, the aggregate welfare will rise by 49% with the poor rural households benefiting the most and thus reducing inequality (see column IV, table 8). The mechanisms for such results are based on the fact that the effective supply of labour to the state-owned sector will drop to 208% (down from 412%), leaving labour to be re-allocated to other sectors where its use is more efficient. As a result of this, the primary sector ends up increasing its exports. In general, trade as part of the country's GDP increases considerably (see table A5 in the appendix).
In general what such a reform shows is that the ingredient that is necessary to be included in a welfare increasing tariff reform is a large and disproportionate reduction of the tariff faced by the SOE sector. This sector has been attracting too many recourses, and as long as this sector is not reformed fundamentally, one should subsidize the imports of the goods produced by the state-owned enterprises. This will reduce the domestic production of these goods and move the freed-up inputs towards other sectors where they can be better used.
Scenarios V-VIII:
tariff reforms under a competitive SOE sector. We now move to a different situation, where tariff reforms are performed after reforming the SOE sector into a competitive sector. Clearly, in that situation the rental rate of capital in the SOE sector will not be zero anymore. Firms in that sector will now have an incentive to choose a more balanced use of capital and labour, and capital rents will be distributed back to households.
To create a new benchmark for analyzing tariff liberalization, we first allow for such internal reforms when no external reforms are yet put into place (i.e. the initial tariff rates are still in place); this is the situation depicted in scenario V. 14 As it is easy to see from table 8, internal reforms result in large gains in all accounts; an overall welfare increase by 97%; a reduction of income inequality with the lower income households experiencing a large 243% increase in their 13 Since tariff levels do not provide much information in this setting, we can not follow the "down to the second highest tariff level"-type of rule.
14 In doing this, we use the same calibration values of the model as for the previous scenarios. A better procedure would have been to re-calibrate the model under the assumption that the benchmark model was fully perfectly competitive and then do the counterfactual that is described in scenario V. However, since in reality the benchmark case is not charcterised by a fully competitive state-owned sector, we do not have the data to do such a calibration correctly. Based on this caveat, scenarios V-VIII should only be seen as illustrative.
income; a 97% increase in production efficiency, real income, and real consumption. All that while wages fall across all sectors and income from rents to immobile factors increases by 634%
As we have discussed above, the non-competitive nature of the SOE sector is the largest distortion in the Vietnamese economy and reforming that sector creates large overall gains. An economy wide efficiency improvement of 97% compared to the benchmark level is unleashed through a migration of effective labour resources to the primary sector (see table A7 in the appendix). This underlines that SOEs first and foremost attract labour resources from the sector with the most labour intensive production. The primary sector is also the main employment sector of the Vietnamese economy, employing some 58% of the working population. Hence, it is no surprise that the lower-income rural Vietnamese population is the big winner of an SOE reform. An increase in real income of 243% (table A9, appendix) to the lower-income rural population brings the average GDP per capita per day from 090 dollars to 111 dollars.
The lower-income urban population stands to lose considerably from the restructuring since an important income source, SOE employment, is downsized dramatically. However, the moneymetric welfare gains accrued to the two other population groups by far exceeds the loss of the lower-income urban population. Thus, by redistributing ex post, Pareto improvement is attainable.
The surge in economic activity in the exporting primary sector improves the purchasing power of the Vietnamese economy, adding to the welfare gains. This is also the essence of the gains from trade: optimal production induces trade patterns that improve consumer welfare by exporting goods of the sector in which the country is relatively more competitive, and importing what is relatively unfavorable to produce domestically.
If now, on top of these internal reforms, we allow tariff reductions then there will be extra gains to the economy. However, these gains are now marginal and of the order one would expect in standard competitive setups. As seen in columns VI-VII of table 8, a WTO-imposed tariff reduction will lead to an extra overall welfare gain of 01%, while a concertina and a proportional reform will increase welfare by 03% and 01% respectively, compared to the benchmark situation described in column V. While the concertina and the proportional cuts were expected to give welfare gains (based on known theoretical results), the fact that the WTO-accession tariff cuts also give comparable welfare gains is reassuring. 15 
Concluding remarks
Developing countries, especially socialist oriented developing countries, highly rely on state production. Indeed, Vietnam relies heavily on state industrial production. Such a predominant position of state-owned enterprises needs special consideration or otherwise mistaken policy conclusions can be made. The policy that this paper considers is the trade liberalization scheme that WTO has imposed on Vietnam upon its accession into the WTO in 2007. Tariffs have to fall in a pre-defined way by 2014. As we show, the ultimate gains from trade liberalization on economic development in Vietnam will be greatly at stake due to the distortions created by the strong presence of state-owned enterprises.
In the model it is assumed that the management in a state-owned enterprise pursues maximization of revenues instead of profits. Such behavior induces over-hiring of labour, attracting extra labour resources from the competitive sectors of the economy. Trade policy should take this into account and design tariffs in order to correct this over-production. 16 The WTO accession-led tariff reform does not take all this into account. Tariffs on stateowned produced goods fall, but not a lot -other sectors' tariffs fall even more. As a result, the WTO accession tariff cuts will worsen the situation for Vietnam with the state-owned sector expanding even more. There are also distributional consequences to be aware of. Our results show that the aggregate welfare loss will hit mostly the lower-income rural population. These are the people that work in the sensitive labour-intensive primary sector. As generally recognized, this rural population is the prime source of poverty in developing countries, so the fact that the welfare losses are primarily within the lower end of the income scale demands special attention.
Policy makers must recognize that state-owned produced goods have to undergo relatively larger trade liberalization than competitively produced goods to secure the gains from trade. Therefore, not even other traditional tariff reforms (such as proportional tariff cuts and concertina cuts) will work in this setting. Such reforms will fail to reduce sufficiently the protection of the state-owned sector and thus bound to fail. Indeed, our calculations show that this is clearly the case.
Inspired by the basic principle behind the concertina tariff cut reform, viz. that we should reduce the highest distortion, we suggest a tariff reform that targets the highest distortion in the present model. We reduce the tariff of the state-owned enterprises leaving the other tariffs unchanged. To show the potential that such a reform can have, we search for the tariff level 16 The optimal tariff levels for such a small open economy are clearly not zero. 20 that will maximize the potential welfare gains. It turns out that the imports of the state-owned produced good should be subsidized by 32% In that case, both the aggregate welfare and the welfare of the low income rural population will rise considerably. • World Bank, 2007, World Development Indicators database, -http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/GDP.pdf.
• WTO, World Trade Organisation, various online information incl. statistics:
-http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact4_e.htm -and http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/schedules_e/goods_schedules_e.htm -http://www.wto.org/WT/ACC/VNM/48/Add.1
